Access control in a hierarchy plays an important role for multi-user communication 
Introduction
Due to the rapid progress of networks and computer technologies on multi-user systems, sharing resources has become widespread over an open network. The administration of these resources is important in a multi-user communication environment. Therefore, access control through authorization becomes more important for wireless communication. The problem of access control for a hierarchy arises in an organization which has a hierarchical structure. This can be used not only in military and government departments but also in private company. A hierarchy is constructed by dividing users into a number of disjointed security classes, 1 2 , ..., m C C C , which are partially ordered with a binary relation "  ". In a hierarchy, the class C C  is that users in class i C can access any information held by a user in class j C , while the opposite is not allowed.
The cryptographic key assignment of access control in a partial-order hierarchy (called key assignment, hereafter) was firstly proposed by Akl and Taylor in 1983 [1] . Later, many schemes had been proposed on this topic [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19] . However, these previous key assignment schemes require several modular exponentiations to derive the lower class of a user's key, or they require a large amount of storage for public parameters [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . The heavy computation and storage are not adequate for the hardware-limited users or mobile units. Recently, without public key cryptography, there are many cryptographic key management schemes had been proposed to solve the above problem in the literature [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] .
Most of above schemes are used one-way hash functions for a user to derive a descendant's key from its own key [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16] . They provide a more efficient method to deal with the key derivation in the hierarchy. The work of [15] is based on interpolating polynomials and gives reasonable performance. However, in [15] , private storage at a node is up to O(n), where n means the number of n nodes (users) in the hierarchy. In addition, a user may be in a company (hierarchy) for only a period of time. If a user resigns or leaves the hierarchy and he premeditatedly eavesdropped on data transmissions, he could then also decrypt the data with old keys. Thus, all messages are likely to be compromised during the span of the system. It is necessary to propose a dynamical access control in a hierarchy for a user to join later or quit a hierarchy. Once a user leaves the hierarchy, he does not have the ability to decrypt the data with his old keys. Some of previously proposed schemes [10, 11, 12] are not easily implemented in dynamically access control in a hierarchy for a user to join later or quit a hierarchy.
On the other hand, for the key derivation, in [13, 14] , they require storages to store all public information for each edge (relation) in the access hierarchy (graph). The space complexity of the public information (edge) is the same as that of storing graph [13] . However, recently, Santis et al. [16] show that Chien's scheme [14] is insecure against a collusion attack. Moreover, in Yang and Li scheme [9] , each key belonging to a user in the hierarchy is only computed through one-way hash functions without any public information for each edge (relation) in the hierarchy. However, they should construct many different one-way hash functions for key generation and derivation in the hierarchy. The number of hash functions is not fixed, it is dependent on the maximum number of direct child users (lower classes) in the hierarchy [9] . It is not convenient for applications because the one-way function has to reestablish once a user is added or deleted.
Owing to the rapid progress of wireless and the limited computing capability in a mobile user's portable device, it is urgent to construct a low-computation key assignment scheme on multi-user systems for secure communications. In this article, we propose a new key assignment scheme for dynamic access control in a hierarchy. By using our method, only the exclusive-or operation (  ) and modular multiplication computations are computed which easily solves the dynamic access control problems such as adding/deleting users in the hierarchy. Without any public information for each edge (relation) in the hierarchy, each key for a user is derived through the exclusive-or operation and modular multiplication computations. The major characteristic of the exclusive-or operation is easy to implement and simple to use. Hence, our scheme is very suitable for the limited computation capacities of users such as smart cards or mobile units.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we propose our key management method. The key assignment for dynamic access control in a hierarchy is presented in Section 3. The security analysis and performance are discussed in section 4. Finally, a brief conclusion is given in section 5.
The proposed key management method in a hierarchy
In the system, there is a central authority (CA) that generates and assigns key to each user in a hierarchy. All secret parameters are managed by the CA. We assume that the partially ordered binary relationship of "  "and i ID is the identity number of user i U . The meaning of
is that user i U can access any information held by a user in j U , while the opposite is not allowed. First, the CA randomly chooses two large primes p and q, and computes pq N  . Then, CA publishes N and keeps (p, q) secretly. We will state some notations and terminology used in our scheme.
There are inheritance relationships among the nodes (users) in a hierarchy, the son i U of node j U is defined as a direct child node of user We give an example of access control in a hierarchy as shown in Figure 1 , where the user 1 U is a direct parent node of users 2 U and 3 U , node 2 U is a direct parent node of users 4 U and 5 U . Similarly, node 3 U is also a direct parent node of users 5 U and 6 U . In this example, the 5 U has two direct parents 2 U and 3 U . Moreover, in a hierarchy, we label a node with no direct parents as a dead-end node; and other nodes are called non-dead-end nodes. For instance as shown in Figure 1 , user 1 U is a dead-end node, the other users 2 3 4 5 , , , , U U U U and 6 U are non-dead-end nodes. The key i K of user (node) i U in the hierarchy is generated by a central authority (CA). Next, we will describe the proposed scheme with ID-based (identity based) as follows.
Figure 1. Inheritance relationships among nodes in a hierarchy
Key assignment:
(1) For a dead-end node, CA gives it an arbitrary key.
(2) If a node j U only has one direct parent node of i U , then the key In this section, we will describe the adding and deleting of a user in our dynamic access control scheme.
(1) Adding a user
When a new user is added, CA will decide if he is a dead-end node or a non-dead-end node. If it is a dead-end node, CA will give a new arbitrary key to him, and all keys of its direct or indirect child nodes will be computed again. For Instance, in Figure 2 , a new dead-end node n U is added. CA gives a new key for n U and all the keys of 1 2 6 , ,..., U U U will be regenerated according to our key assignment method in Section 2.
Figure 2. Adding a dead-end node
If the newly added user j U is not a dead-end node, then CA will derive the key of j U from its direct parent nodes. Following that, the keys of ' j U s direct and indirect child users will be updated. The remainder keys for other users will not be changed.
For instance, in Figure 3 , if a new non-dead-end node 7 U is added in Figure 1 , the key of user 7 U will be derived from its parent node 1 U , that is
and the key of 7 '
U s direct and indirect child nodes 3 5 , , U U and 6 U will be regenerated by using our key assignment method. In this case, their new keys will be U . The other keys will not be updated. Figure 4 we assume 1 U is deleted by Figure 1 , ,and U U U will be regenerated by using our key assignment method. That is, CA gives a new key 2 K  and 3 K  for the user 2 U and 3 U , respectively. Then 4 5 6 , , and U U U will be following the same as the proposed key assignment method. 
The other keys will not be changed. Hence, the proposed scheme can be easily implemented as a dynamic access control because most of the keys need not be changed once a user is added or deleted. In this situation, the bit-length of a key is also equal to that of the exclusive-or operation which is not affected. 
Security analysis and performance comparisons
In this section, we discuss the security analysis and the performance of the proposed key management method. In the proposed method, the key generation and key derivation in a hierarchy are obtained through the XOR (exclusive-or operation) and quadratic residue modulo N. Without knowing the secret p and q, it is very hard for anyone to derive K from On the other hand, if a user S is one of the direct parent nodes of user R, then a user S may have the key of user R. According to our key management method, with the key of R, the user S cannot easily obtain the keys of other direct parent nodes of R. For example: As shown in Figure 1 , in Section 2 of the proposed scheme, 5 U has two direct parents 2 U and 3 U , the key Figure 5 , since 2 ' U s direct child 5 U has more than one parent in the original structure of Figure 1 , according to our key management method, CA will change 5 
( ) With regard to the efficiency, to the best of our knowledge, Yang and Li's scheme [9] is more efficient than most of previously proposed schemes [10, 11, 12, 14] . For this reason, we only compare our scheme with Yang and Li's scheme [9] . In [9] , the key derivation by a user (node) of a descendant's access key requires about L hash function operations, where L is the length of path between the nodes. In our scheme, the key derivation only takes L XOR operations and L modular multiplication computations. Thus, based on the XOR operation and quadratic residue modulo N, our key generation and key derivation are more efficient to implement and simple to use than previously proposed schemes which are constructed by hash functions [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16] . In addition, in the key derivation, our scheme does not require any public information for each edge (relation) in the access hierarchy (graph). Hence, the low-computation and few public information properties are very appropriate for hardware-limited users.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a new cryptographic key assignment scheme in a hierarchy for hardware-limited users which can reduce much of the information storage for the public (secret) parameters of each authenticated user. In our method, there is no need for modular exponentiation and hash function for a user to derive other secret keys. Moreover, the proposed scheme has the following properties. 1. The key generation and key derivation algorithms are quite simple and efficient. 2. It can be easy to implement dynamic access because most other keys of the system need not be immediately changed once a user is added or deleted. 3. The bit-length of each key is independent of the number of users in the hierarchy.
